World Public Forum

Published on 22 October 2010

Written by WPF Dialogue of Civilizations

Fred DallmayrBy Fred Dallmayr - Packey J. Dee Professor in the Departments of Philosophy and Political Science at the University of Notre Dame (USA), Member of the WPF – “DoC” International Coordinating Committee delivered at the Eighth Rhodes Forum plenary session

Cultural interaction does not always occur in the “space of dialogue.” The purpose of this paper is to discuss alternative models of global politics, in an effort to profile the so-called “dialogue of civilizations.” The question I want to raise is: what is meant by dialogue as an alternative model of global politics? In which way does dialogue add a new dimension to global politics? The answer I want to offer is that dialogue opens a promising path toward global justice and peace, because it is predicated on equality and interdependence and the cultivation of lateral ethical responsibilities and is oriented toward the vision of a global “good life”. My discussion will concentrate on tree main issues. First, how does the dialogue model differ from other familiar models of global politics? Secondly, how in particular does the model differ from the more recent conception of a “world state” or world government? And lastly, what are the concrete political implications of the model? Is dialogue completely free of political conflict?

1. Alternative Models of Global Politics
From a historical perspective, global politics has been dominated chiefly by two models: empire and inter-state rivalry. Ancient history, both in the East and the West, is replete with examples of “empire” or at least strong imperial ambitions. Digging deep into the past, we find records of a Sumerian empire, of Assyrian, Babylonian and other Mesopotamian empires. Particularly impressive — stretching over several millennia — are the records of the Egyptian empire which left its imprint on many subsequent developments. Of even greater longevity was the Chinese empire in the Far East. Turning to the “Western” world, we find the examples of the Macedonian empire and somewhat later of the Roman Empire. In all these cases, “empire” designated the effort to provide an efficient, more or less centralized administration governing or ruling over major segments of the then known world.

Empires, of course, are not confined to ancient history. During the Christian Middle Ages we find the Byzantine Empire (characterized by “caesaro-papism”) and the Holy Roman Empire (governed by the dual authority of Emperor and Pope). As we know, these Christian structures were challenged by the rise of Muslim empires: first, the Ummayyad and Abbasid caliphates, and later the Ottoman, the Persian Safavid, and the Indian Mughal empires. There is no need here to talk about familiar modern Western analogues: the Spanish, the British, the French, the Portuguese, and other empires. What characterizes all these empires, again, is the attempt to impose a uniform and more or less homogeneous structure, in “top-down” fashion, on vast expanses of territory (despite occasional concessions to regional or local customs and traditions). Briefly put: empire is built on command not dialogue.

Following the religious wars in Europe, a new model emerged in the West: the model of inter-state rivalry, also called the “Westphalian” system. In terms of this model, nation-states live in their mutual relations in a “state of nature” which (in the language of Thomas Hobbes) is a state of overt or latent warfare due to the absence of a superior arbiter. The justice or propriety of the claims of nation-states is ultimately decided (and can only be decided) by armed force—despite the slow emergence of an always fragile “law of nations” seeking to impose legal rules on the arbitrary conduct of states. During modern times, the Westphalian system has steadily extended its sway from Europe to the rest of the world. The school of international “realism” (so-called) is firmly wedded to this model and counts among its devotees politicians and experts around the world (including such experts as Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and Samuel Huntington).

It is evident that the dialogue model cannot subscribe to the Westphalian paradigm. What the dialogue model appreciates is the decentralization effected in that paradigm, that is, the replacement of a monistic top-down structure by lateral relationships and by the emphasis on regional, national, or ethnic freedom or autonomy. Where the dialogue model parts company is in the conception of sovereign autonomy — which, in the Hobbesian-Westphalian paradigm, boils down to the pursuit of selfish interests (national interests, security interests), usually without any regard for lateral ethical responsibilities. Here the dialogue model insists on the close linkage of independence and inter-dependence, or differently put: on the linkage of freedom and ethics or autonomy and civic virtue. The question is how ethical interdependence can be cultivated in the modern context.

2. World State, Global Government
I turn here to the second issue mentioned above. The perceived need to foster interdependence and to overcome the pitfalls of the Westphalian system has prompted many scholars to seek refuge in the conception of a world state or global government. For many or most of these scholars, the idea of a world state does not involve a simple return to traditional forms of “empire”. Most of them do not favor heavy-handed or monolithic global structures; in opposition to top-down modes of imperialism they advocate a “democratic” world state or world government, where “democratic” means the active participation of people around the world as “world citizens.” The so-called “anarchy” of states is overcome here through the establishment of global political institutions capable of effective global policy-making.

How should one respond to this global agenda from a dialogical angle? Clearly, devotees of dialogue must appreciate the stress on global interdependence and the endeavor to curb the pointless rivalry between states — which in our time may issue in a global nuclear holocaust. Moreover, one needs to emphasize that dialogue is not in principle opposed to political structures and institutions. What is at stake is a matter of emphasis.¹  In the absence of ethical cultivation and transformation, the global world state is likely to follow in the footsteps of the modern nation-state which (in Max Weber’s terms) has become a soul-less machine or an “iron cage”. In the absence of the dialogical fostering of civic responsibilities, world government is likely to function as a totalizing super-bureaucracy smothering freedom and difference — and this despite well-meant “democratic” rhetoric or intentions. As it happens, my dialogical reservations concerning world government are supported by Kantian philosophy, and especially by Kant’s famous treatise on “Perpetual Peace”. As will be recalled, Kant in that treatise proposed a “peaceful (or pacific) federation”, a “foedus pacificum”, which would link together states or political entities while respecting their integrity, autonomy, and diversity.²  Thus, Kant’s proposal sought to correlate freedom and moral responsibility, political autonomy and public ethics—which is precisely also the aim of the “dialogue of civilizations”. His proposal is admirable and can be endorsed, to an extent, by proponents of dialogue, but the latter would wish to recast the proposed federation as an alliance not so much of nation states as of broader civilization, cultures, and civil society associations.

3. Political Struggle and Conflict
The dialogue model is often criticized as too optimistic and too naive; especially the idea of a “dialogue of civilizations” is often attacked as too “un-political”, that is, insufficiently concerned with the role of power struggle, and conflict in public life. This criticism has been articulated with particular vigor by Carl Schmitt (the recently rediscovered German thinker). For Schmitt, any genuine reflection on politics must start from the premise of a basically flawed or “evil” human nature — a premise which necessarily leads to the conclusion that only governmental power or a coercive public authority (in fact: a “sovereign” authority) can establish order in society and the world.³

There is a logical cogency to Schmitt’s argument which friends of democracy and a dialogical world order should not ignore. This is not the point to subject his argument, and especially his “concept of the political,” to a detailed assessment and critique.⁴  Only a few points must suffice here. The assumption of an “evil” human nature is only a speculative hypothesis; it by no means universally confirmed by human experience nor universally endorsed by all philosophers and theologians. For humanists, the assumption is an insult to humanity; for religious believers, it is equally an insult to the divine “creator.” Many prominent thinkers — for example, Mencius and Rousseau — held the precisely opposite view, namely, that humans are essentially good and benevolent. For myself, I hold a middle position, to the effect that there are both good and evil potentialities in human beings. Which of those possibilities is actualized, depends on the mode of cultivation and habituation, that is, the nurturing of either destructive impulses or else of private and civic “virtues.” To the extent that civic virtues are properly cultivated, the need for coercive governmental power (though not government per se) is reduced and potentially canceled.

The dialogue model does not ignore the role of conflict and struggle. But note: the accent is shifted here subtley from power-political struggle to ethical-political struggle. The Mahatma Gandhi had a word for the latter: “satyagraha” (often translated as “truth force”). Why is there struggle? First, in dialogue all concerned parties must be enabled equally to participate in the contest. But there are enormous inequalities in the world obstructing dialogue: inequalities between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the powerless, the oppressors and the oppressed. To rectify or ameliorate this situation, agonistic struggle is clearly necessary — but struggle not in the sense of warfare but in the sense of satyagraha and non-violence (ahimsa). Secondly, the struggle is ultimately for justice and truth, and in that struggle no one has a monopoly of the definition of these terms; hence, struggle must mean an open, fair-minded and tolerant search for a just society and just world order. This does not amount to an endorsement of relativism or the view that “anything goes.” Here, the basic meaning of “dia-logue” comes to the fore: that the “logos” or truth is “between” participants. Thus, despite different perspectives, all have to take seriously the need for justice and the removal of obstacles standing in its way. This means: we need to struggle with each other in the search for justice and truth. This search, in turn, points the way to peace. According to the old proverb: “peace is the fruit of justice” (opus justitiae pax).

¹ Compare in this regard my essay “Cosmopolitanism:  Religious, Moral, and Political”, in Peace Talks—Who Will Listen? (Notre Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), pp. 89-110.

² See Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace:  A Philosophical Sketch”, in Kant’s Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 104.

³ See on this point Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, expanded ed., trans. George Schwab (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2007).

⁴ I have done this in “The Concept of the Political:  Politics between War and Peace,” in my Integral Pluralism:  Beyond Culture Wars (Lexington, KY:  University of Kentucky Press, 2010), pp. 23-44.